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Abstract Following the social identity perspective and using data from two
national surveys, the present research examines among the native Dutch their
recognition of discrimination against immigrants (Study 1) and their intention to
protest against this (Study 2). It was found that stronger endorsement of a common
national identity was associated with higher recognition and stronger protest
intention. However, higher perceived power threat was associated with lower
common identity endorsement and thereby to lower recognition of discrimination
and reduced willingness to protest. At the same time, a less in-group centric per-
spective (deprovincialization) was associated with higher recognition of discrimi-
nation and willingness to protest because of a stronger endorsement of common
identity. The similar results in the two studies support the generality of the proposed
processes and add to the limited research on when and why majority members
recognize and act against group-based injustices.
Keywords Discrimination  Protest  Dual identity  Power threat 
Deprovincialization
Introduction
Discrimination implies unequal treatment and is an important mechanism for
establishing and maintaining group-based social hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). Discrimination of immigrants and ethnic minorities creates structural barriers
to, for example, education, employment, income, housing and medical care. There is
a large literature on the negative psychological consequences of being a target of
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discrimination (see Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002)
and an even larger literature on the causes and correlates of prejudicial attitudes and
discriminatory behavior (see Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). There also
is research on how minority members cope with the discrimination they face,
including collective action and protest (e.g., Fleischmann, Phalet, & Klein, 2011;
Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). The endorsement of and participation in
actions that aim to improve the rights, power and influence of one’s disadvantaged
minority group can play an important role in challenging and changing discrim-
inatory practices (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Successful social change also requires that the advantaged group recognize
discrimination and the resulting unfairness of the hierarchical situation. Arguably,
this recognition and the willingness of majority members to join in collective action
against discrimination is just as important for changing intergroup relations
(Subasˇic´, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). However, more work is needed on majority
group members’ willingness to become actively involved in fighting discrimination
(Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). According to the
social identity perspective (Turner & Reynolds, 2001), psychological change in
people’s understanding of themselves and others is at the core of social change. It is
when majority members redefine the minority as an in-group that political solidarity
with the minority is likely (Subasˇic´ et al., 2008). The redefinition of a higher-level
common identity depends on people’s understanding of their in-group and the out-
group, and the related intergroup boundaries.
The present research examines the role of common national identity for majority
members’ recognition of discrimination against immigrants and their willingness to
protest against it. The key proposition tested is that the endorsement of a shared
national identity is associated with higher recognition of discrimination (Study 1)
and a stronger intention to protest (Study 2). Furthermore, we consider perceived
power threat and the normative meaning of the majority identity as influencing the
perception of categorical group boundaries and thereby making the endorsement of
a common national identity less or more likely. Higher perceived power threat was
expected to be associated with a weaker endorsement of a common national
identity, and via common identity to lower discrimination recognition and intention
to protest. Additionally, a more deprovincialized (less in-group centric) identity was
expected to be related to higher discrimination recognition and intention to protest
because of a stronger endorsement of a common identity. Thus, common national
identity was examined as a mediator in the relation between perceived power threat
and the normative meaning of the in-group identity, on the one hand, and
discrimination recognition and protest, on the other hand. The expected associations
were examined in the context of the Netherlands and by using data from two
national surveys among native Dutch.
Common Identity
According to the social identity perspective (social identity theory and self-
categorization theory; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, and Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987), political solidarity becomes possible when the majority shares an
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identity with the minority (Subasˇic´ et al., 2008). Solidarity implies higher-level
unity whereby the minority is recategorized as in-group. Self-categorization theory
(Turner et al., 1987) further argues that the common, superordinate identity provides
the comparative context in which subgroup identities are understood. This means
that the shared identity does not imply the loss or submergence of subgroup
identities within the common in-group but rather captures a sense of unity in
diversity: ‘solidarity denotes higher-level unity rather than lower level uniformity’
(Subasˇic´ et al., 2008, p. 337). The emphasis is on the superordinate identity
(‘unity’), a sense of common belonging, rather than on subgroup differences
(‘diversity’).
This emphasis is similar to the Common Ingroup Identity Model of recatego-
rization (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009) that builds on the social identity
perspective. This model stresses the importance of a shared identity representation
for lower intergroup bias, the recognition of group-based inequality, facilitating
justice concerns among majority members, and providing a context for moral
inclusion of minorities (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Tyler & Blader, 2003). This is
especially important for majority members who are more likely to recognize and act
against discrimination of minority group members included in a shared national
category.1 In an experimental context, common identity salience was found to
promote willingness to protest on behalf of an ethnic minority member (Banfield &
Dovidio, 2013). Further, survey research among majority members in the USA
demonstrated that stronger national identification predicts stronger support for
policies to reduce inequities between ethnic minority and majority groups (Smith &
Tyler, 1996), and greater sensitivity to just treatment (Huo, 2003). Yet, these studies
did not investigate the endorsement of common identity and did not consider factors
that can weaken or strengthen this endorsement. We examined whether a stronger
endorsement of a common national identity that acknowledges cultural diversity
(unity in diversity) is associated with higher recognition of discrimination of
immigrants and stronger willingness to protest against this discrimination. In
addition we investigated whether perceived power threat and deprovincialized
beliefs are related to common identity endorsement, and thereby to recognition of
discrimination and protest intention.
Power Threat
The concept of threat is central in social psychological theorizing and research on
intergroup relations. Social identity threat can take different forms, such as the
belief that in-group distinctiveness is undermined, in-group value is questioned, or
in-group dominance and power is challenged (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, &
Doosje, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Knowles, Lowery, Chow, &
Unzueta, 2014). Individuals employ a range of social identity management
1 The survey assessed various other constructs and parts of these data have been analyzed in other papers
(e.g., Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2014; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Verkuyten, Martinovic, &
Smeekes, 2014). However, the current theoretical focus and analysis is novel and the findings have not
been published previously.
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strategies when confronted with these kinds of threat, such as sharpening of group
boundaries in trying to clearly differentiate the in-group from other groups.
Acknowledging and challenging discrimination of disadvantaged minority
members undermines the maintenance of group-based social hierarchies that favors
the advantaged (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Members of advantaged groups tend to
desire a stable social system that benefits them (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). They are motivated to protect their power position and favor
ideologies such as assimilation and color-blindness that serve to justify the status
quo (Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Verkuyten, 2006). They tend to focus on ideologies
and identity representations that justify and mask group-based privileges and
disparities, and are reluctant to address power differences in interactions with
minority members (Saguy et al., 2008). According to the group position model
(Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999), dominant group members become motivated to defend
their advantaged position when they feel a threat to their in-group’s status and
power. One important response to this threat is the strengthening of subgroup
boundaries, which contributes to perceived in-group homogeneity and cohesiveness,
and undermines feelings of commonality with out-groups (Ellemers et al., 2002;
Wright & Baray, 2012). Strong subgroup boundaries make intergroup competition
more likely than intergroup solidarity, which depends on a shared identity (Subasˇic´
et al., 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This leads to the expectation that majority
members who more strongly perceive that immigrants threaten their group’s power
will less strongly endorse a common national identity representation that
acknowledges cultural diversity and will therefore be less inclined to recognize
discrimination of immigrants and protest against it.
Deprovincialization
The social identity perspective emphasizes that intergroup perceptions and behavior
should be understood in relation to the meaning of one’s social identity (Turner,
1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Research has shown, for example, that the way in
which people understand their in-group affects out-group tolerance, perceptions of
intergroup inequality and its perceived legitimacy, and the intention to become
politically active in support of ethnic minority groups (e.g., Reicher, Cassidy,
Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2012; Subasˇic¸
& Reynolds, 2009).
The meaning of one’s social identity can be understood in various ways, such as
in terms of historical narratives, self-attributed characteristics, self-defining norms
and values, and ideological beliefs (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).
For example, majority members tend to be aware of their privileged identity status
(Knowles et al., 2014), attribute more positive self-defining characteristics to their
in-group, and can consider their in-group culture as providing the self-evident and
invariant standard for judgment. In contrast to the latter ethnocentric view with its
sharp group boundaries, it is also possible to consider one’s in-group culture as only
one of the many different and valid ways of perceiving and dealing with the social
world. This ideological belief has been described as deprovincialization in social
psychology (Pettigrew, 1997; also see Brewer, 2008). It implies a less in-group
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centric understanding, whereby in-group norms and values do not function as the
self-evident standards for perceiving and evaluating the world. Having a deprovin-
cial view limits the normative importance of the in-group as the standard for
judgment in intergroup comparisons. In the current study we examine the
expectation that majority members’ with a more deprovincialized view on their
in-group culture will more strongly endorse a common national identity that
acknowledges cultural diversity and therefore be more inclined to recognize




Participants for Study 1 (N = 928) were from a national sample of the native Dutch
population maintained by a Dutch bureau specialized in collecting representative
population data. The sample reflected the population in terms of age, gender,
education, household size and the region of residence. The participants completed
the questionnaire online. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 88 years
(M = 49.84, SD = 17.15), and 48 % was female. On a 7-point scale that
corresponds to the Dutch educational system, 3.7 % of the participants indicated
that primary education was their highest obtained level of education. 16.2 %
completed lower secondary and 4.5 % middle secondary education, 34.8 % had a
vocational diploma, 4.9 % completed higher secondary education (preparing
students for a university), 23.3 % obtained a Bachelor’s degree, and 12.5 %
obtained a Master’s degree or higher. Based on the political self-placement (Jost,
2006), 28 % of the participants placed themselves at the political left, 44.1 % in the
middle, and 27.9 % at the right.
Measures
The items used for constructing the variables were all measured on a scale ranging
from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).
The first independent variable perceived power threat was assessed with three
items that emphasize the difference between natives and immigrants: ‘Because
many immigrants live here, native Dutch people have less and less influence’, ‘The
native Dutch are slowly losing the Netherlands to newcomers’, and ‘Sometimes it
2 For minority group members a dual identity model that simultaneously emphasizes superordinate
and subgroup identities is typically more appropriate and more strongly endorsed (Dovidio et al., 2007;
Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). This is not the case for natives in non-settler countries such as the Netherlands
and Germany. One important reason is that the linguistic representations of nationhood and of the native
population correspond: Dutch typically means ethnic Dutch (and Germans typically means ethnic
Germans). So a dual identity representation is problematic for the native Dutch because they
do not consider themselves to have a dual identity (Verkuyten, 2014).
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seems like natives have to adjust to newcomers, instead of the other way around’
(see Hindriks, Verkuyten, & Coenders, 2015). The three items were averaged
(a = .90) and a higher score indicated more perceived power threat (M = 4.55,
SD = 1.46).
The second independent variable deprovincialization was captured by four
questions that tapped into in-group culture relativism (Martinovic & Verkuyten,
2013). Sample items are ‘Our Dutch culture is certainly not better than other
cultures’, and ‘How we perceive the world in the Netherlands is only one of the
many possibilities’ (a = .86, M = 5.33, SD = .95).
The mediator endorsement of common national identity was measured with three
questions that asked about the importance of having an overarching national
community, despite cultural diversity.3 Thus the emphasis was on the ‘unity’ aspect
of unity in diversity, and this was assessed with items adapted from Gaertner, Rust,
Dovidio, Bachman and Anastasio (1996): ‘Even though the Netherlands is a
culturally diverse society, I have the feeling we all belong to one community’, ‘In
spite of the cultural differences, all groups together make up Dutch society’, and
‘Despite all the differences, I often have the feeling that we are one country and that
we have to work together’ (a = .90; M = 4.15, SD = 1.47).
The dependent variable recognition of discrimination of immigrants was
measured using three items: ‘Immigrants are often being discriminated when
applying for a job or an internship’, ‘Immigrants are often discriminated in nightlife
settings’, and ‘In everyday life, immigrants often face discrimination’ (a = .91;
M = 4.04, SD = 1.22).
Table 1 shows the correlations between the core constructs. All the associations
are significant and in the expected directions.
Results
The Measurement Model
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was obtained from Mplus (version 7) to
inspect whether the items for the recognition of discrimination, common national
identity, power threat, and deprovincialization represent separate latent constructs.
A model with four latent factors fitted the data very well, v2(59) = 165.30,
p\ .001, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .988, Tucker Lewis index (TLI) = .983,
Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation (RMSEA) = .044 (low = .036,
high = .052), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .028. Each of
3 It could be argued that these items measure the endorsement of multiculturalism. However, in the
Netherlands multiculturalism is predominantly understood as the belief that the identity and cultural
traditions of disadvantaged minority groups should be recognized and respected. Thus the focus is on
acknowledging minority identities and the lack of attention to commonalities is a main reason for why
multiculturalism has been strongly criticized and increasingly rejected (Verkuyten, 2014). The items do
not focus on the recognition and minority identities but rather on the importance of national unity and
cohesion despite cultural differences. Yet, in the European context it has been argued that an emphasis on
unity in diversity is an important aspect of interculturalism (Cantle, 2012; Meer & Modood, 2012) which
means that the items can be considered to measure the endorsement of this particular aspect of
interculturalism.
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the items loaded high on the designated factor, with loadings ranging from .61 to
.95. Any combination of a three-factor solution (e.g., combining power threat with
common dual belonging) yielded a significantly worse fit than a four-factor model.
We are therefore confident that we are dealing with four empirically distinct
constructs.
Explaining Differences in Perceptions of Discrimination
A structural model of recognition of discrimination was estimated that included
power threat and deprovincialization as two independent predictors, and common
identity as a mediator. We initially controlled for age, gender, education, and
political orientation in relation to the mediator and the dependent variable, but we
ultimately only kept the significant paths from the control variables in the model.
These include the path from age to discrimination and from political orientation to
common identity. This results in a more parsimonious model, while the findings and
conclusions regarding the hypothesized relationships do not change.
The model fitted the data well, v2(83) = 348.83, p\ .001, CFI = .969, TLI =
.962, RMSEA = .059 (low = .052, high = .065), SRMR = .079. The findings
related to the hypothesized paths are presented in Fig. 1, and they are in line with the
expectations.4 Stronger endorsement of a common national identity was related to
higher perceived discrimination of minorities. Furthermore, power threat was
associated with lower, and deprovincialization with higher, common identity. We
used bootstrapping with 1000 replacement samples to obtain 95 % confidence
interval for indirect effects. An indirect effect is indicated by zero not falling within
the confidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). We found a significant indirect
effect from power threat to discrimination via common identity, b = -.112,
t = -4.49, p\ .001 (lower CI = -.170, higher CI = -.070), and a significant
indirect effect from deprovincialization to discrimination via common identity,
b = .114, t = 4.13, p\ .001 (lower CI = .068, higher CI = .176). Significant
direct paths did remain from power threat to discrimination, b = -.134, t = -2.97,
Table 1 Correlations between the main constructs: Study 1 (N = 928) below the diagonal and Study 2
(N = 173) above the diagonal
1 2 3 4
1. Power threat – -.51*** -.40*** -.42***
2. Common national identity -.56*** – .52*** .52***
3. Deprovincialization -.39*** .48*** – .37***
4. Discrimination of immigrants -.33*** .39*** .33*** –
Discrimination of immigrants: Study 1 recognition of discrimination against immigrants, Study 2
intention to protest against discrimination of immigrants
*** p\ .001
4 Regarding the control variables, older participants perceived more discrimination of minorities,
b = .006, t = 2.66, p = .008, and those with a more right wing political orientation endorsed the idea of
common belonging less, b = -.129, t = -3.83, p\ .001.
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p = .003, and from deprovincialization to discrimination, b = .230, t = 3.58,
p\ .001, indicating partial mediation.
We also tested an alternative model in which common identity was specified as a
predictor of power threat and deprovincialization, which in turn were directly
related to the recognition of discrimination. We included the significant paths from
age to discrimination, from education to power threat and from age and education to
deprovincialization. This model also had a good fit, v2(82) = 221.44, p\ .001,
CFI = .984, TLI = .980, RMSEA = .043 (low = .036, high = .050), SRMR =
.031, but the indirect paths were weaker. The path from common identity via
deprovincialization to discrimination was positive, b = .072, t = 3.56, p\ .001
(lower CI = .033, higher CI = .113), whereas the path via power threat was
negative, b = -.082, t = 3.03, p = .002 (lower CI = .027, higher CI = .132).
These findings suggest that there is more support for our theoretically guided model
in terms of causal reasoning, but the model with reverse causality is also plausible.
Discussion
As expected the findings show that higher perceived power threat is associated with
a lower endorsement of a common national identity representation that acknowl-
edges cultural diversity (unity in diversity), which, in turn, is related to lower
recognition of discrimination of immigrants. Deprovincialization, in contrast, is
associated with a stronger sense of common identity, thereby with a stronger
recognition of discrimination. Importantly, these results were found among a
representative sample of the native Dutch population and when controlling for













Fig. 1 A path model explaining differences in native Dutch people’s recognition of discrimination of
immigrants (N = 928). Note Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in the brackets. Paths from
the control variable political orientation to the mediator and from age to the dependent variable were
accounted for in the model. **p\ .01; ***p\ .001
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their group’s power they tend to reject a one-group representation in which the
emphasis is on a shared national identity despite cultural diversity, which, in turn, is
associated with the recognition of the discrimination that immigrants face. On the
other hand, being able to look beyond one’s in-group’s norms and standards (a
deprovincialized outlook) is associated with stronger awareness of the presence of
discrimination in society, via a sense of common national belonging that
acknowledges cultural diversity.
Study 2
The goal of Study 2 was to examine whether the findings obtained in Study 1
generalize to majority members’ intention to protest on behalf of immigrants.
Recognizing discrimination of immigrants is a first step in doing something about it
but does not have to imply that one is willing to take action against this form of
injustice. Ideologies that justify the status quo (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and
psychological tendencies of system justification (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004)
reduce the likelihood of wanting to correct group-based disparities. There is often a
‘principle-implementation gap’, whereby majority members endorse the principle of
equality but do not support social change policies and actions, such as protest on
behalf of a disadvantaged group (Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007; see also
Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). This kind of protest directly challenges group-
based inequalities and in-group privileges and can elicit social disapproval and
resistance from other majority group members.
Method
Data and Participants5
Dutch natives aged 19 to 81 (M = 51.77, SD = 16.24; 48 % female) took part in
this online study (N = 173). Data were again collected by the same Dutch bureau
but among a different sample of the native Dutch that represents the adult native
Dutch population in terms of the main demographic characteristics. In terms of
political self-placement, 27.8 % of the participants placed themselves at the
political left, 27.7 % in the middle, and 27.1 % at the right, and 17.9 % did not
indicate a political orientation.
Measures
Perceived power threat (M = 3.93, SD = 1.44), the endorsement of a common
national identity representation (M = 4.61, SD = 1.64), and deprovincialization
5 Parts of these data have been used elsewhere (Verkuyten, Martinovic, & Smeekes, 2014) but the current
findings have not been published previously. The sample size in this study was smaller compared to Study
1 because of financial limitations.
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(M = 5.48, SD = 1.34) were measured with similar items used in Study 1 (a = .86,
a = .88, and a = .87, respectively).
For measuring participants’ intention to protest against the discrimination of
immigrants we used the following introduction: ‘Various studies have demonstrated
that discrimination of immigrants in applying for a job, at work and in everyday life
happens quite often. How likely is it that you would do one of the following things
to protest against discrimination of immigrants in the Netherlands’? Subsequently, a
list of four actions was given: (1) sign a petition against discrimination, (2)
participate in an anti-discrimination demonstration, (3) donate money for an anti-
discrimination campaign, and (4) put up an anti-discrimination window poster.
Participants were asked to indicate the likelihood of participating in these actions on
a 5-point scale (1 = no, certainly not, 5 = yes, certainly). The items formed a
reliable scale (a = .80, M = 2.24, SD = .83).




A CFA in Mplus (version 7) yielded a four-factor solution for the items measuring
power threat, deprovincialization, common identity, and the intention to protest
against the discrimination of immigrants. The model had a good fit, v2(71) =
134.62, p\ .001, CFI = .952, TLI = .939, RMSEA = .072 (low = .053,
high = .090), SRMR = .058, and all the items had high loadings on the designated
factor (.64–.95). The four-factor solution fitted the data better than any other
combination of three factors (e.g., common identity and deprovincialization being
combined into one factor). This again confirms that the four theoretical constructs
are measured in an empirically distinct way.
Explaining Differences in Intentions to Protest
We estimated a structural model with protest against the discrimination of
immigrants serving as the dependent variable, power threat and deprovincialization
as main predictors, and common identity as a mediator. We again controlled for age,
gender, education, and political orientation in relation to the mediator and the
dependent variable. Only the significant paths from political orientation to the
mediator common identity and to the dependent variable protest were kept in the
model.
The model had a good fit, v2(157) = 290.24, p\ .001, CFI = .924, TLI = .909,
RMSEA = .070 (low = .057, high = .083), SRMR = .063. The relations are in
line with our hypotheses and with the findings from Study 1 (see Fig. 2).6 Power
6 As to control variables, participants with a more right wing political orientation endorsed the idea of
common belonging less, b = -.255, t = -2.37, p = .018, and they were less willing to protest against
discriminatory treatment of ethnic minorities, b = -.190, t = -2.11, p = .002.
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threat was related to a weaker and deprovincialization to a stronger sense of
common identity. Further, Dutch natives who had a sense of common national
identity reported higher intention to protest against discrimination of minorities.
Applying the same bootstrapping technique as in Study 1 (see Preacher & Hayes,
2008), we found the expected significant indirect effects. Power threat was, via
lower common identity, related to a lower intention to protest against discrimination
of minorities, b = -.044, t = -1.99, p = .046 (lower CI = -.105, higher
CI = -.013), whereas deprovincialization was related to a higher intention to
protest, due to a stronger sense of common identity, b = .103, t = 2.06, p = .039
(lower CI = .031, higher CI = .249). The relationship between deprovincialization
and intention to protest was fully explained by common national identity: The
remaining direct effect was not significant, b = .025, t = 0.27, p[ .10. In contrast,
the direct path from power threat to discrimination was significant, b = -.106,
t = -2.21, p = .027, suggesting partial mediation.
We again estimated an alternative model with common identity as a predictor of
power threat and deprovincialization, which were then related to the intention to
protest. We included the significant paths from political orientation to protest
intention, b = -.184, t = -3.01, p = .003, and from education to power threat,
b = -.227, t = -2.97, p = .003. This model also had a good fit, v2(96) = 180.38,
p\ .001, CFI = .940, TLI = .926, RMSEA = .071 (low = .055, high = .087),
SRMR = .064. The path from common identity via power threat to intention to
protest was significant, b = .054, t = 2.06, p = .040 (lower CI = .011, higher
CI = .113), but the path via deprovincialization was not significant, b = .009,
t = 0.24, p = .812 (lower CI = -.068, higher CI = .092). This is due to the fact
that deprovincialization was not directly related to the intention to protest, b = .022,













Fig. 2 A path model explaining differences in the intention of native Dutch to protest against
discrimination of immigrants (N = 173). Note Unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in the
brackets. Paths from the control variable political orientation to the mediator and to the dependent
variable were accounted for in the model. *p\ .05; **p\ .01; ***p\ .001
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to protest via power threat (original model), but power threat had no indirect effect
on protest via deprovincialization (alternative model).
Discussion
Focusing on the intention to protest against discrimination on behalf of immigrants,
the findings of Study 2 provide further support for the roles of perceived power
threat, deprovincialization, and a sense of common national belonging (unity in
diversity). Higher power threat was again related to a weaker endorsement of
common identity, which, in turn, was related to more protest intention. Thus, when
majority members feel a threat to their group’s power they tend to reject a one-
group representation of the nation that acknowledges cultural diversity, and this is
indirectly related to the willingness to protest against discrimination of immigrants.
Furthermore, deprovincialization turned out to be related to a higher protest
intention. This was because Dutch natives with a less provincial view on their in-
group’s norms and values were more likely to have a sense of a common national
identity that recognizes cultural diversity.
General Discussion
Understanding when and why majority group members recognize the discrimination
that immigrants face and are willing to take action against discriminatory practices
has obvious practical implications. Because of their dominant position and greater
resources, majority members play an important role in achieving equality and social
change. Yet, research has predominantly focused on collective action by immigrant-
origin groups (Fleischmann et al., 2011; Simon & Grabow, 2010; Simon & Ruhs,
2008) and has largely ignored the perspective of the majority (Banfield & Dovidio,
2013; Subasˇic¸ & Reynolds, 2009).
In two studies with national samples, the present research examined whether the
endorsement of a common national identity representation that acknowledges
cultural differences (unity in diversity) is associated with increased recognition of
discrimination of immigrants and greater willingness to protest against it.
Furthermore, it was examined whether perceived power threat and deprovincial-
ization reduce the endorsement of a common identity representation and thereby the
recognition of discrimination and protest. The findings of both studies provide
supporting evidence for the expected associations and support the theoretical
propositions of the social identity perspective (Turner & Reynolds, 2001).
First, political solidarity is more likely when majority members redefine
minorities as an in-group and develop a sense of unity in diversity (Subasˇic´ et al.,
2008). Solidarity implies higher-level unity and the common in-group identity
model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) argues that a one-group representation facilitates
the recognition of ethnic group disadvantages and helps to establish a context of
moral inclusion with the related justice concerns for all members included in the
superordinate category (Dovidio et al., 2009; Huo, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2003).
The findings in both studies showed that a higher endorsement of a ‘unity in
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diversity’ representation of the national category was associated with higher
recognition of discrimination that immigrants face and stronger willingness to take
action against this form of exclusion.
Second, the findings suggest that there are independent out-group focused (power
threat) and in-group focused (deprovincialization) influences on perceptions of
discrimination and the willingness to protest against it. According to the group
position theory (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999), people who feel a threat to their group’s
power will tend to defend their position and thus can be expected to be less likely to
endorse a common identity representation that includes immigrants and minority
groups. This turned out to be the case in both studies, and it demonstrates that
perceived power threat can play an indirect negative role in discrimination recognition
and the willingness to protest against discrimination of immigrants. Majority members
who feel that minorities threaten the power of their group are more likely to resist a
common national identity that recognizes cultural diversity. Yet, and in addition to
these indirect effects, higher perceived power threat was also directly associated with
lower perceptions of discrimination and willingness to protest. This indicates that this
type of threat makes it difficult to acknowledge and challenge discrimination that
contributes to the maintenance of group-based social hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). One possible reason for this is that feelings of threat legitimize discriminatory
behavior against immigrants (Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopez, 2010). This legitimizing
role of threat perceptions could be examined as an additional mediating mechanism in
future studies. Furthermore, future studies could examine whether this legitimizing
role depends on individual differences in, for example, authoritarianism and just world
beliefs (Lima-Nunes, Pereira, & Correia, 2013).
The findings further show that a more deprovincialized (less in-group centric)
worldview is associated with a stronger endorsement of a shared representation of
the national category and, via this endorsement, to the perception of discrimination
and intention to protest. Majority members’ who have a more deprovincialized
understanding of their in-group culture tend to acknowledge and recognize the value
of other cultures (Pettigrew, 1997). The findings show that higher deprovincializa-
tion was associated relatively strongly with the endorsement of national unity in
diversity. Furthermore, in Study 2 the effect of deprovincialization on the
willingness to protest against discrimination of immigrants was fully mediated by
common national identity. Yet, in Study 1 there was also a direct effect, which
suggests that additional mechanisms might be involved in this relationship. One
possibility for future studies is to examine whether a less in-group centric
worldview implies enhanced perspective taking, which has been found to reduce
negative out-group attitudes (Galinski & Moskowitz, 2000).
Some limitations of the current research should be considered. Much of the
research on social identity and attitudes toward minority groups examines student
samples (Henry, 2008), while we used two national samples. Yet, the research was
conducted in one particular country with its own history of immigration. Countries
differ in many ways and representations of national identity vary depending on the
historical and socio-political context. These differences might be important for
understanding the role of perceived power threat, deprovincialization and common
national identity for the recognition of discrimination of immigrants and one’s
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willingness to protest against it (Guimond et al., 2013). Future studies should
examine the generality of the current findings in other national contexts.
Furthermore, although we examined both the recognition of discrimination and
the willingness to protest, we did not investigate behavior, such as actually donating
money or signing a petition. Although protest intentions and behavior tend to be
associated (Van Zomeren et al., 2008), it remains to be seen whether the current
results hold for actual protest.
Another limitation that should be acknowledged is that no causal inferences can
be drawn because the two studies were cross-sectional. The order of associations
examined was theoretically derived, and there is also experimental evidence that a
common identity representation promotes the intention to protest against discrim-
ination of minority members (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013). Yet, it is, for example,
also possible that common identity endorsement reduces feelings of power threat
and stimulates a more deprovincialized worldview (Riek, Mania, Gaertner,
McDonals, & Lamoreaux, 2010). In both Studies, this alternative model also fitted
the data but compared to the proposed model the indirect effects were weaker or not
significant. It is the combination of theoretical considerations, fit indices of models,
and significance tests of the indirect effects that gives the best understanding of the
mechanisms involved (Danner, Hagemann, & Fiedler, 2014). It is likely, however,
that the relationships are not unidirectional and that the different constructs
influence each other. The present results, then, show possible and plausible
directions of mutual influences between feelings of threat, deprovincialization and
the endorsement of a common national identity that acknowledges cultural
diversity. As such they provide part of the answer to the complex question of the
social psychological factors that underlie majority members’ recognition of
discrimination of immigrants and their willingness to protest against it. Future
studies should use experimental and longitudinal designs for examining the
proposed causal order and the possibility of bidirectional relationships.
In conclusion, using two national samples the similar results in both studies support
the generality of the findings and add to the limited but important research on when and
why majority members recognize group-based injustices and are willing to protest on
behalf of disadvantaged minority groups (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Saguy et al.,
2008; Subasˇic¸ & Reynolds, 2009). The results show the importance of national identity
representations and the relevance of considering out-group focused (perceived threats)
and in-group focused (deprovincialization) determinants. Given the findings, future
studies are advised to investigate other majority groups in other countries and to
consider additional mediating processes (e.g., perspective taking ability) and
moderating conditions (e.g., just world beliefs).
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